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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes various organizational design theories and intrinsic 
motivational models to evaluate the feasibility of creating an unrestricted line SWCC 
officer program. 
The two deployable operating factions within Naval Special Warfare (NSW) are 
the SEALs and the SWCC operators. Of the personnel inventory of SWCCs, the majority 
are enlisted with the exception of Chief Warrant Officer, which commissions directly 
from the enlisted force. The current model has the SEAL community providing the 
command-level and officer leadership for the SWCC community. Two case studies were 
analyzed: the all-enlisted Air Force Pararescue community, which developed the Combat 
Rescue Officer program in 2000, and the Norwegian Marine Jaegar Kommando, which 
combined combat diver and boat operators into a singular maritime special operations 
unit underneath a newly designed special operations command. This research concludes 
that the current SWCC manning model would have to be changed to support the creation 
of an unrestricted line officer program, but doing so could incentivize SEAL 
junior officers. The new model should create greater leadership opportunities 
between the SWCC and SEAL communities. This was demonstrated successfully in 
the Air Force in creating an officer corps from an existing enlisted career field. 
Likewise, the Norwegians demonstrated that reorganizing using a 
similar organizational design effectively increased efficiency and leadership. 
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Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewman is commonly referred to as SWCC. 
While the U.S. Navy has always had a need for small light craft, the lineage of modern-
day SWCC can be tied back to the days of World War 2.1 From the attack on Pearl Harbor, 
until the Japanese empire surrendered, the Patrol Torpedo (PT) boats proved to be a quick, 
nimble and adaptable craft. The true potential of small craft for the use of clandestine 
operations was utilized in the Atlantic theatre by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to 
secretly insert and extract OSS agents from occupied Europe.2 Using modified PT Craft 
Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron 2 completed 19 missions for the OSS between May and 
Nov 1944. The squadron was able to complete all 19 missions while never once received 
enemy fire, or were compromised by the enemy.3 The use of small craft for clandestine 
operations would later be utilized during the Korean conflict, and especially during 
Vietnam.  
The amphibious nature of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam was a strategic resource 
for the National Liberation Front, also known as Viet Cong. After a report by Capt. Phil H. 
Bucklew showed that the waterways of S. Vietnam were being utilized to smuggle enemy 
troops and supplies, the United States ramped up a maritime presence in Vietnam.4 The 
U.S. Navy saw significant success with the Patrol Boat Riverine (PBR) and Patrol Craft 
Fast, which were nicknamed “swift” craft, in maritime operations. U.S. Navy Seals 
successfully utilized the boat crews to conduct insertion and extractions, reconnaissance, 
and fire support. After the Vietnam conflict, the capability for riverine and inshore crafts 
faded; the U.S. Navy concentrated on the Soviet Union, the Cold War and a concentration 
on deep blue water large vessel missions. Therefore, the U.S. Navy consolidated and 
 
1 Michael Hull, “The Navy’s Gallant Sentries,” Naval History 28, no. 5 (2014): 2, 42–49. 
2 Hull, 47. 
3 Robert J. Bulkley, At Close Quarters: Pt Boats in the United States Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1962), 349–50. 
4 Jason B Scheffer, “The Rise and Fall of the Brown Water Navy: Changes in the United States Navy 
Riverine Warfare Capabilities from the Vietnam War to Operation Iraqi Freedom” (Master’s thesis, Army 
Command and General Staff College, 2005), 5–6. 
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reorganized several of the boat teams throughout the 1980s and ’90s. While the Navy as a 
whole reduced the size of the small boat fleet, Naval Special Warfare (NSW) had a mission 
requirement to maintain a fleet of small crafts.5 Recognizing the need to retain high talented 
boat operators NSW began an assessment and selection course of instruction. Additionally, 
NSW closed-looped the SWCC community in 1994, this enabled source ratings to stay for 
an entire career within NSW and not be pulled to fulfill other Naval billets. This paper will 
examine the organizational design, and make a recommendation to improve the efficiency 
of NSW.  
A. THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SWCC 
During the fiscal year 2018, the Special Warfare Combatant Craft Community 
within Naval Special Warfare has faced a negative growth.6 Simply put, the number of 
SWCC operators who are leaving the Navy exceeds the number of operators generated 
from the SWCC training pipeline.  
The training pipeline is solely comprised of enlisted members. The Navy’s A school 
to qualify SWCCs, affectionately known as “SWCC school.” Figure 1 demonstrates that 
this timeline can take in excess of 30 weeks of qualification-based training. Attrition rates 
within the schoolhouse measure approximately 50%. The timeline from a member joining 
the Navy until they are assessed, trained and qualified to deploy, as a SWCC, can take in 
excess of three years. In order to maintain a healthy community, and due to the selective 
nature and length of training, it is imperative for NSW to maintain the retention of mid-
level management. Early separations can dramatically reduce the number of deployable 
SWCCs. This can have a dramatic and lengthy effect on the growth and health of the 
SWCC community.  
 
5 Scheffer, 53. 
6 The current enlisted Special Warfare Boat Operator (SB) rating is manned at 93% as of Feb 2019. 
However, there is a disparity amongst the billets that are listed on the enlisted programmed authorizations 
(EPA) and the actual billets that the SWCC rating is fulfilling. The disparity has led NSW to conduct a 
manpower study during 2019, however the results have not been publicized at the time of writing.  
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Figure 1. Expected Timeline for SWCC School Candidate.7 
As requirements for special operators within the maritime domain have risen, so 
has the requirement to deploy SWCC operators in support of U.S. efforts. SWCC operators 
are increasingly being deployed to meet these demands. Both deployment time and the 
number of deployment locations have drastically increased during the last decade. The 
increased operational tempo puts a tremendous strain on the SWCC community, and the 
gap of available deployers to requirements has become despairingly large. So, while the 
requirements have increased, the number of available deployers has shrunk. Stated another 
way, NSW’s Optempo is up whereas inventory is down.  
The two deployable operating factions within NSW are the SEAL community and 
the SWCC community. Since the initial inventory of the SWCC community is solely 
enlisted, the SEAL community provides the officer leadership, from junior to flag levels, 
for the SWCC community. At the command level, SEAL officers serve as the command 
management of commanding officer, executive officer, and department head levels. While 
at the deployable troop level SEAL junior officers provide leadership; however, many of 
the leadership billets at Special Boat Teams do not count towards their advancement. The 
lack of contributed credit creates an incentive issue; there is potential that junior officers 
will not take leadership roles within the SWCC community seriously. Conversely, since 
the SEAL community currently has an excess of junior officers above the quota for 
billeting, the lack of career advancement at a SWCC team creates a backlog and slowdown 
 
7 Department of the Navy. 2019. Navy Learning and Development Roadmap: Special Warfare Boat 
Operator. Washington, DC: Department of the Navy. https://www.cool.navy.mil/usn/LaDR/sb_e4_e9.pdf. 
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of a SEAL junior officer career. The potential lack of leadership incentives can create 
organizational problems for both the SEAL and SWCC communities. The SEAL 
community could benefit from incentivizing leadership billets, while the SWCC 
community can benefit from unit cohesion and incentivized leadership.  
1. Research Question 
What affect would the development of a SWCC unrestricted line office program 
have on NSW operational and career development?  
2. Supporting Questions 
Will the addition of an additional qualification designator incentivize SEAL 
junior officers and create recognized leadership opportunities between SWCC and 
SEAL Naval special warfare communities? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW  
In order to properly explore literature that will benefit the research of this thesis, 
I have organized the literature review as follows: an introduction of historical NSW 
research, with specific mention to SEAL and SWCC histories. The next portion will 
examine different types and organization of officer communities. Additionally, I will be 
using organizational theory references to compare and contrast various models to further 
explain the gap that exists in research for the SWCC community.  
The SWCC community has evolved significantly over the last two decades; the 
force has increased in manpower, technological development of craft, and significant 
organizational changes from conventional to special operations. Until 1994, the community 
was open to conventional Naval forces. Seeing a need for a dedicated, selected and highly 
trained individuals, Naval Special Warfare began a selection course to retain the traditional 
maritime force operating the high-speed vessels for NSW.8 In 1994, NSW created a newly 
designed selection and training pipeline to identify and retain the best operators for surface 
maritime special operations. Since the SWCC community is one of the youngest 
 
8 Robert Benson, “The Go-Fast Teams,” All Hands, no. 1048 (August 2004): 25. 
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communities within NSW, the SWCC operator is solely enlisted. This in turn means that a 
SWCC does not serve at the command leadership level. This quality of leadership remains 
controlled by the SEAL community.9 This leads to a gap and an organizational design flaw 
between the communities. While, one community provides leadership, and the other 
community has no internal representation at the command level. This situation creates 
friction between both NSW communities. Little literature to date has identified the 
leadership challenges between the SEAL and SWCC community. The Naval Officer 
Manpower and Personnel Classification manual provide the officer designators and pay-
grades to provide a framework for officer career paths. The current manual lists and 
describes positions for SEAL / SWCC commanding officers, but does not delineate the 
specific peculiarities and differences between each community.10 This research will 
compare the author’s experience along with relevant works to identify ways to improve 
both NSW leadership and overall organizational design to better command both SEAL and 
SWCC teams.  
The Special Operations Forces Reference Manuel explains the NSW 
organization.11 A SEAL junior officer who accepts a position at a SWCC boat team will 
command up to 30 SWCC operators and up to six different maritime crafts. Conversely, a 
SEAL junior officer at a SEAL team will control 16 operators. These two officers will not 
receive the same recognized credit at promotion, with more advancement emphasis placed 
upon the junior officer who accepted the position at a SEAL team versus the officer who 
was at the SWCC team. Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate graphically the difference in 
organization. In Figure 2 the SEAL 0-3 has more boats and supporting crews, with less 
officer oversight than the SEAL O-3 in Figure 3. The disparity between the two billets 
 
9 Joint Special Operations University, Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fourth edition 
(MacDill AFB, Florida: The JSOU Press, 2015), 4–12. 
10 Bureau of Naval Personnel, Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications 
(Washington, DC: Dept. of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, 2019). 
11 Joint Special Operations University. At the time of writing Naval Special Warfare is completely 
reorganizing the structure underneath a plan called NSW Force optimization. The Force Optimization is a 
phased approach to reorganize the commands underneath NSWC. This thesis will not examine the Force 
Optimization model, as the first phase has only begun at the time of writing. Additionally, the research will 
focus mainly at the echelon 3 level of command and will not be affected by the Force Optimization model. 
6 
leads to a contrasting example of intrinsic leadership. In order for SWCC to maintain its 
best and brightest leaders, an intrinsic reward system should be in place for junior officers. 
Edward Lawler explains various reward systems in “Creating a new employment deal: 
Total rewards and the new workforce.”12 This research will draw upon Lawler’s 
conclusions to demonstrate the lack of incentive and the compounding effects this lack has 
upon leadership, subordinate satisfaction, and retention. John Minor’s research on 
employee response John Miner’s Organizational Behavior 1: Essential Theories of 
Motivation and Leadership will be utilized for the incentivization of NSW leadership.13 In 
their work for Management Decision, Applebaum, St-Pierre, and Glavas stress the 
importance that leaders face when in developing strategic changes within organizations. 
Additionally, Applebaum et al. ascertain that different types of rewards and incentives 
enabled by leaders will strongly dictate the successful changes in organizations. 
Applebaum’s theories will be applied to examine the junior officer leadership level, to 
identify a potential incentive gap exists that improperly incentivize junior NSW officers. 
 
12 Edward E. Lawler, “Creating a New Employment Deal: Total Rewards and the New Workforce,” 
Organizational Dynamics 40, no. 4 (2011): 302–4, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2011.07.007. 
13 John B. Miner, Organizational Behavior 1: Essential Theories of Motivation and Leadership 
(Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2015). 
7 
 
Figure 2. Notional Boat Team.14  
 
Figure 3. Notional Seal Team.15  
The need to incentivize junior officers extends beyond the immediate leadership at 
the small troop level. In A New Look at Phycological Climate and Its Relationship to Job 
Involvement, Effort, and Performance, Brown and Leigh identify shortfalls that lead to 
 
14 JSOU Press, 4-11. 
15 JSOU Press, 4-12. 
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incentive gaps.16 As pointed out in Developing Leadership Talent by Berke and Kossler, 
an organization will not optimally function without the alignment of strategic goals and 
organizational purpose.17 Without incentivizing junior officers, NSW will lose the 
potential of developing senior-level officers supportive of SWCC initiatives.  
C. PREVIOUS RESEARCH CONDUCTED ON LEADERSHIP WITH NSW 
Previous academic literature on NSW and leadership has focused on the SEAL 
community. Research by David Nash thesis Structuring NSW Lead Chief Petty Officers 
Combat Leadership Course called to enhance senior enlisted leadership within NSW.18  
However, this work lacks mention of the SWCC and the possible benefits from a shared 
training course. The motivation for this research is the lack of mention of SWCC, and to 
be able to provide an in-depth look into the organizational cohesion among the SEAL and 
SWCC communities.  
Allman, Fussell, and Timmons’ thesis on High-Value Talent: Identifying, 
Developing, and Retaining NSW’s Best Leaders identified similar retention problems 
among middle-level career officers within NSW.19 This research will expand upon their 
work of three key findings: every organization struggles to develop and retain the most 
talented workers, which is driven primarily by the senior leadership; organizations can use 
both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, including both financial and non-financial tools to 
retain their best people; and a robust human resources department aids in talent retention.  
 
16 Steven P. Brown and Thomas W. Leigh, “A New Look at Psychological Climate and Its 
Relationship to Job Involvement, Effort, and Performance,” ed. Philip (editor) Bobko, Journal of Applied 
Psychology 81, no. 4 (1996): 358–68, https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.4.358. 
17 David Berke, Michael E. Kossler, and Michael Wakefield, Developing Leadership Talent., vol. 
4562, Policy Research Working Paper (San Francisco, CA: Pfeiffer, 2008). 
18 David F. Nash, “Structuring Naval Special Warfare’s Lead Chief Petty Officer’s Combat Leadership 
Course” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA524720. 
19 Walter H. II Allman, Jonathan M. Fussell, and Marty D. Timmons, “High Value Talent: Identifying, 
Developing, and Retaining Naval Special Warfare’s Best Leaders” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2012), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5706. 
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Unit cohesion within NSW operational units was explored in depth by Jennings and 
McRandle.20 Their work has shown that at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of 
NSW the greater performance and effectiveness will be achieved through an emphasis on 
unit cohesion. Additional factors, including retention, mission focus, and expectation 
management may be more easily controlled by senior leadership by a focus of unit 
cohesion. The prevention of short-term critical retention issues from turning into trends 
within the SEAL community can also apply to the SWCC community. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
While junior officers do provide leadership for the SWCC community, they 
currently do not receive promotional leadership credit for this leadership position.21 
Methodologically, this study will first seek to establish a conclusion between 
organizational, equity, and incentive theories contrasted with a possible lack of leadership 
motivation. This data will be examined and contrasted against equity theories to see if any 
disincentive might exist for junior officers who transfer to the SWCC teams.  
This research will examine two case studies using a compare and contrast model. 
The first case study will be of an elite unit within SOCOM. The second case study will 
examine international partners and a reorganization of their maritime special forces.  
1. Comparative Case Study within SOCOM 
The NSW community is not the only community within the SOCOM enterprise to 
experience a communication separation between the officer to senior enlisted personnel, 
and the unique organizational challenges inherent to both. The Air Forces Combat Rescue 
Officers (CRO) developed from the Pararescue (PJ) community in 2000.22 The Air Force 
 
20 Bryan V Jennings and James T McRandle, “Attacking the Lion: A Study of Cohesion in Naval 
Special Warfare Operational Units” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011). 
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5706. 
21 In 2019, NSW completed a manpower distribution study. The study aims to examine the distribution 
of SWCC personnel across the SOCOM enterprise. However, at the time of writing the results have not 
been made public. A recommendation for further research is to contrast the results of the manpower study 
against this research.   
22 “Combat Rescue Officers Celebrate 10-Year Anniversary,” States News Service, 2010. 
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had identified a mission capability within the solely-enlisted PJ community and thus 
created the CRO career field. Upon the CRO implementation, AFSOC established billets 
for 165 officers to lead and command combat-rescue operations as direct combatants while 
providing personnel recovery subject-matter expertise. The possession of a nearly identical 
case study of a similar-sized special operations force to the SWCC and NSW community 
provides an excellent comparative case study. This case study will use the principles 
outlined in George and Bennett’s Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences to utilize a proper comparative case study.23 This case study will demonstrate the 
ability of NSW to learn from the previous traits of AFSOC and access the feasibility of 
designing a similar course of action.  
2. Comparative Case Study with International Partner Forces 
Organizational problems are not solely unique to U.S. operations. The Norwegian 
Marine Jeger Kommandoen and HÃrens Jeger Kommando combined into a single unit and 
is now simply referred to as MJK. This singular force is the maritime special operations 
component of the Norwegian military. Previously, in 2014, boat operators and combat 
divers were two distinct units; Norwegian strategic leadership identified possible 
organizational design shortfalls and unified into one singular unit.24 U.S. NSW and the 
Norwegian MJK can be contrasted in a case study.  
 
 
23 Alexander L. George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, BCSIA Studies 
in International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005). 
24 Tom A. Robertsen, “Transforming Norwegian Special Operation Forces” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2006), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2801. 
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS AND  
TACTICAL APPLICATION 
Mintzberg describes the essence of an organization. Additionally, he gives different 
types of organizations and how the workers and managers are aligned. Mintzberg describes 
that the best possible organizations utilize the best mix of managers and workers for the 
mission of the organization.25 While Mintzberg is great for describing the organizational 
structures of military communities, such as SWCC and Pararescue, this is not the best 
model for describing the motivations of individuals and the teams that comprise these 
organizations. For lack of a better-suited organizational model, I will be using 
Applebaum’s into Strategic Organizational Change (SOC) research to describe the effects 
that SOC can have upon leadership, learning, motivation, and productivity.26 
According to Applebaum: most organizations do not have to be successful at every 
aspect, but the most successful organizations demonstrate fewer negative effects when 
compared against their positive attributes. The specific attributes of any organizational goal 
are imperative to successful change. This goal must be articulated and shared by leaders, 
the whole of the organization must be able to identify commonality and  “where the 
organization is headed.” Applebaum further describes leadership as “a process through 
which a person tries to get others in the organization to do what that leader wants.”27 
Additionally, the authors use other sources where the leader’s actions are what link people 
to tasks and accomplish work. An organization’s ability to motivate individuals is directly 
tied to reward incentives. Often society tends to think that technological advances create 
barriers to “change,” however the largest barriers are the barriers that involve people.  
SWCC has become professionalized, from an Ad Hoc nature where fleet sailors 
received a single tour of duty at a boat team, to a closed-looped community with 
 
25 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?,” Harvard Business Review 59 (1981): 103. 
26 Steven H. Applebaum, Normand St-Pierre, and William Glavas, “Strategic Organizational Change: 
The Role of Leadership, Learning, Motivation and Productivity,” Management Decision 36, no. 05 (1998): 
7, https://doi.org/10.1108/00251749810220496. 
27 Applebaum, St-Pierre, and Glavas, 7. 
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developmental milestones. The next progression should be the development of a leadership 
core and cadre that has much incentivized and buys into the community. As Applebaum 
points out the hardest change is not the incorporation of new technologies, but rather the 
changes that involve people.28  
A. TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF SWCC  
The SWCC community is a qualification- based community. Since the community 
revolves around the use of maritime crafts, the qualifications are based upon the positions 
and experience that is held with within the crew of these craft. As previously mentioned, 
the community was not closed-looped until 1994.29 Prior to this date, sailors would be 
ordered to a billet, receive training, deploy and then possibly leave the NSW community. 
The addition of a Naval Education Code (NEC), the goal was to retain sailors that were 
qualified in accordance to personal qualification standards (PQS) on the crafts that they 
operated.30 In 2001, the NEC was changed to 5352 and a qualification device was awarded 
to the community. In 2006, the community changed from source ratings to becoming its 
own individual rate of Special Warfare Boat Operator, or shortened to SB. Also, in 2016, 
the community changed the warfare device to reflect the qualifications that are tied to each 
level of responsibility. Figure two demonstrates the three qualification levels of Basic, 
Senior, and Master.31  
 
28 Applebaum, St-Pierre, and Glavas, 12. 
29 “U.S. Navy Enlisted Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewman (Swcc) Specialist Badge,” 
accessed November 6, 2019, http://www.uniforms-4u.com/p-special-warfare-combatant-craft-crewman-
badge-3384.aspx. 
30 Christopher Menzie, “NSW Community Establishes New SO and SB Ratings,” Navy News Service, 
October 10, 2016, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=25916. 





Figure 4. SWCC Warfare Devices and Associated Qualifications.32  
Upon graduation of SWCC school an enlisted SWCC is awarded the Basic SWCC 
qualification. This denotes that the sailor has qualified by successfully completing SWCC 
school, as well as become familiar with the operations and maintenance of the crafts. The 
sailor at this stage will serve as a crewman, and operate the internal workings and functions 
of that craft. Although there are no specific ranks associated with the qualification, based 
upon the authors experience the sailors that will hold this qualification will be E-1 through 
typically E-5.  
The next qualification level is SWCC Senior. An operator at this level has mastered 
the functions of the craft and will now be in charge and qualified as a coxswain. A SWCC 
senior is responsible for the crew and the operation of that craft. This qualification is 
typically comprised of E-5 through E-7 sailors. A NSWC letter, 1414, designates that a 
sailor has until his sixth year of checking into an NSW command to qualify as a SWCC 
Senior.33 The letter is a reinforcement that the community is qualification based. The letter 
also provides command leadership guidance to promote operators to progress through 
qualifications and ensure upward community career mobility. Another benefit and aim is 
to reduce personnel bottlenecks and level distribution throughout the SWCC community. 
The pinnacle qualification is a SWCC Master. At this level, the SWCC has already 
known the internal functions and missions and inner workings of the craft. Once the 
 
32 U.S. Navy Personal Command, 2019. 
33 Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, COMNAVSPECWAR INST 1414.3A Enlisted 
Naval SPecial Warfare Combatant-Crewman Specialist Qualification (San Diego, CA, 2013). 
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internal skills are mastered the next step is to be able to control the external functions, 
planning, and mission execution of multiple craft. The SWCC Master correlates to a patrol 
officer and the operator is now capable of directing the functions of multiple craft 
simultaneously.  
To summarize the qualifications and the interrelation to each other. The SWCC 
basic are the operators that are running the internal functions of the boat. The SWCC Senior 
is the coxswain in charge of the boat, both driving and leading the craft. The SWCC Master 
is leader responsible for directing multiple crafts operating in one mission.  
The interrelationship of SEAL and SWCC operating simultaneously on a small 
craft creates the potential for a conflict involving the authority of control. The senior person 
on the water could be either a SWCC or a SEAL. While the SWCC operator will have the 
qualification and expertise of operating the craft, they do not have the rank of an officer. 
Indeed, there arises a question of who can order a craft underway, and the performance 
execution of that craft. An officer that outranks an enlisted person that is driving the craft, 
who is actually in charge? Can an officer order an enlisted person to operate their craft, 
when the enlisted person has the expertise to know what is the proper execution of that 
craft? 
William McRaven speaks of a disaster that was nearly an exact recipe of this 
disorganization.34 In his book, Sea Stories, he describes a training mission where a rigid 
hull inflatable boat (RIB) had capsized during a training evolution. There was confusion 
about who was in charge and if the sea state was greater than the crafts capability. 
Ultimately the craft got underway in unsafe conditions and capsized. Several sailors were 
injured. Fortunately, no one died or was critically injured by this mishap.  
The confusion over rank and expertise ultimately lead the Navy to implement a 
regulation delineating the authority aboard small Naval Crafts.35 Article 1033 of the 1990 
Naval Regulations deems that the senior line officer is in charge on a boat. However, the 
 
34 William McRaven, Sea Stories (New York, NY: Grand Central Publishing, 2019), chap. Nine. 
35 Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Regulations 1990 (Washington, DC, 2018), chaps. 10-
Precedence, Authority, and Command. 
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same article also provides an exception if the boat is assigned a petty officer or officer in 
charge, as designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The high tactical risk and 
authority denoted why SWCC is qualification based. Today a SEAL junior officer can 
command a special boat troop, or even an SBT, without ever having carried the 
qualifications of a patrol officer or equivalent of a SWCC master.  
B. FORMALIZATION AND TRAINING OF NSW LEADERS 
1. SEAL Officer Career Paths 
From the beginning of formalized training for Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL 
Training (BUD/s) officers and enlisted have attended the same assessment and selection 
training.36 An oft-cited reason for this is that this instills leadership and perseverance 
together along with a sense of humility for both the officer and enlisted career fields.37  
SEAL officers that are designated as officers of the line are considered unrestricted 
line officers. An unrestricted officer is an officer with the rank of ensign or above that  
is not restricted in their performance of duty.38 In other words, this means an officer that 
can assume command of a Naval Command, be it a ship, aircraft squadron, or a special 
boat team.  
Out of the Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications 
(NOOCS), the definition of an Unrestricted line officer is an officer not restricted in the 
performance of duty.39 Each officer community is assigned a designator code, a four-digit 
number to account for personnel and administrative purposes. The current designator of a 
SEAL officer is 1130, An Unrestricted Line Officer who is qualified in Special Warfare.40 
 
36 BUD/S officially began in 1983, the forerunners of SEALs were the Underwater Demolition Teams, 
or UDT, the formal training for this organization as well the officers and enlisted alike attended training 
together and develop unit tactical leadership and respect amongst the officers and enlisted.  
37 Navy SEAL + SWCC Scout Team Center Naval Special Warfare, “BUD/S Training Stages,” 
SEALSWCC.COM, accessed October 27, 2019, https://www.sealswcc.com/navy-seal-training-stages.html. 
38 Department of the Navy, U.S. Navy Regulations 1990, 10-Precedence, Authority, and Command. 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/US%20Navy%20Regulations/Chapter%2010%20-
%20Precedence,%20Authority%20and%20Command.pdf 
39 Bureau of Naval Personnel, Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications, A-2. 
40 Bureau of Naval Personnel, A-10. 
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In addition to the regular designator codes certain officer positions are eligible for 
additional qualification designation (AQD). An AQD is a unique or special qualifier that 
is awarded based upon the officer serving in the capacity of a specific billet. The NOOCS 
currently lists the AQD QD1 as either a SEAL Troop Commander or a major department 
head of an SBT.41 So, as currently stated, the NOOCS does not award a leadership AQD 
to a troop commander of an SBT, even though the troop commander has as much— if not 
more— responsibility  than a troop commander of a SEAL team.  
2. Career Path of an Enlisted SWCC 
The Navy Enlisted Occupational Standard for Special Boat Operators (SB) is the 
official naval document that outlines the SWCC rating.42 The manual currently listed an 
SB job description as:  
Special Warfare Combatant-Craft Crewmen Basic perform a multitude  
of duties during Special ` missions; require skills to operate and maintain 
small arms and crew-served weapons, engineering systems, tactical 
communications equipment, Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)/Unmanned 
Underwater Vehicle (UUV), use air delivery techniques, tactical medicine, 
joint and combined operations, perform Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and 
Radiological Defense (NBCRD), intelligence gathering, and interpret 
foreign language communications; and are experts in maritime operations.43  
The SWCC student must pass an Assessment and Selection of SWCC school. This 
is a volunteer program that is designed to assess and select the best candidates. The school 
is taught in Coronado, California, and takes place in phases. Prior to 2006, SWCC drew 
from source ratings. A candidate would make it through SWCC school and would have to 
transfer to a rating that was accepted by the NSW community. A candidate would come 
from only approved naval ratings, for example gunners mate and interior communication 
electrician were accepted rates, whereas the navy’s nuclear field rates were not accepted as 
source ratings. Officially in 2006 a Navy enlisted occupational standards request was 
 
41 Bureau of Naval Personnel, D-223. 
42 Department of the Navy, Manual of Navy Enlisted Manpower and Personnel Classifications and 
Occupational Standards Volume 1 (NAVPERS 18068F, 2019), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/nec/NEOCSVol1/Documents/JUL%202019%20OCCSTD_Manual_CH-79.pdf. 
43 Department of the Navy, SB-4. 
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placed, NSWC developed the Center for SEAL and SWCC, and implemented ratings for 
SEALs and SWCCs, SO and SB, respectively.44 Prior to the implementation of the 
individual SB and SO ratings, the individuals that held NSW NECs would compete for 
advancement against the original source ratings.  
 
Figure 5. Flow Chart of SWCC Career Path.45  
Special Warfare Combatant Crewman students held a Navy Enlisted Classification 
(NEC) of 052A.46 Upon receiving a contract a new SWCC candidate, both first time 
enlisted and fleet conversion students will attend an eight-week Navy Preparatory 
School.47 Then will attend the introductory course, followed by Basic Crewman Training 
for eight weeks, and Crewman Qualification Training for 13 weeks.48 During any point in 
the training a student may drop on request (DOR), as this is a voluntary program. Upon 
Graduation from SWCC school the NEC will convert to 5352. 
 
44 Menzie, Christopher. “NSW Community Establishes New SO and SB Ratings.” Navy News Service, 
October 10, 2016. https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=25916. 
45 U.S. Navy Personal Command, 2019. 
46 U.S. Navy Personnel Command, 98. 
47 Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command, “Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval 
Special Warfare,” December 3, 2015, 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/WISR_Implementation_Plan_Navy.pdf. 
48 Department of the Navy, “SB - Special Warfare Boat Operator Rating Fact Sheet,” November 2019, 
https://www.cool.navy.mil/usn/enlisted/rating_info_cards/sb.pdf. 
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3. SWCC CWO Program 
The SWCC community does have an officer program, albeit it is a chief warrant 
officer (CWO) program. Chief warrant officers are line officers that are appointed as 
officers, directly from former enlisted ratings, to serve as technical field experts.49 The 
field was announced in 2000.50 The original intent was to take senior enlisted SWCC  
that promoted to CWO, to serve as officers in charge aboard the largest NSW craft, at the 
time, the MKV. At the time of the writing, new craft have been introduced and the MKV 
has been retired. The later models of NSW crafts no longer have CWO serving as troop 
commanders. This position remains filled by SEAL officers. CWO do routinely serve  
as second in command to these NSW troops. Further research is recommended to increase 
the position and incentives of SWCC CWO to serve as the troop commander and above 
positions.  
C.  SUMMARY  
NSW continues to evolve as the relationship with SOCOM deepens within the 
National Defense Strategy. Specifically, NSW has reorganized the SWCC enlisted force 
from source ratings into the well-respected SB rating. However, the leadership at the junior 
officer level, continues to favor advancement and leadership over SBT service rather than 
service at a SEAL team. Both the SWCC and SEAL communities have unique 
requirements that don’t necessarily overlap. Both organizations have differences that can 
be highlighted by different missions, career milestones, and small-unit organizational 
structures. Since SWCC moved from its ad hoc origins it has become a respected, metered 
and measurable Navy rating. The next step could be to improve the leadership incentives 




49 Bureau of Naval Personnel, A-2. 
50 Naval Special Warfare Group Two Public Affairs Office, “Commissioning Program Created for 
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III. CASE STUDY WITH AF PARARESCUE 
AND NORWEGIAN SOF 
Naval Special Warfare is far from the only Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) community that has faced problems of enlisted and officer cohesion. 
Specifically, within the SOCOM enterprise, the Air Force’s Pararescue (PJ) community 
went from an all enlisted force, similar to SWCC, to the creation of a Combat Rescue 
officer (CRO) program in 2000. This research intends to draw parallels between the two 
communities and use the Pararescue community’s development of the combat rescue 
officer as a case study to example lessons learned. Pararescue provides for a good similarity 
to compare against SWCC. First, pararescue was solely enlisted prior to the creation of 
CRO. Second, the size of the community was roughly the same size as SWCC. Third, both 
communities fall underneath the special operations forces (SOF) umbrella and each has 
unique assessment and selection. Finally, both communities were ultimately controlled by 
another organization. My aim is to draw out that pararescue provided a viable and feasible 
model that the naval special warfare can emulate with the SWCC community.  
A. COMBAT RESCUE OFFICER CASE STUDY 
1. Mission and Organization 
Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) mission, as outlined the SOF 
Reference Manual  is “to organize, train, and equip Airmen to execute global special 
operations.”51 Since the Air Force has a predomination in air warfare, there exists a need 
to have a specialized force capable of conducting special operations personal recovery 
quickly and efficiently to augment mission forces in high-risk operations. This is especially 
imperative where the effective integrations of airpower and/or recovery of personnel and 
equipment are imperative to mission success.52 Personal Recovery is one of the Air Force’s 
core functions. Although USSOCOM, no longer maintains that CSAR is a core function of 
SOF, it still remains imperative and an important element central to SOF mission 
 
51 S Joint Special Operations University, 5-1. 
52 Joint Special Operations University, 5-24. 
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execution. USSOCOM defines CSAR as, “the tactics, techniques, and procedures 
performed by forces to affect the recovery of isolated personnel during combat.”53  
As will be outlined in further sections currently CRO, PJ, and combat control team 
(CCT), tactical air control party (TACP), and special operations weather teams (SOWT) 
are organized into Special Tactical Squadrons (STS). The STSs fall underneath AFSOCs 
24th Special Operations Wing (SOW) out of Hulbert Field, Fl. Underneath of the 24th 
Special Operations Wing is two operational groups, the Special Tactics Groups, 720 and 
724, respectively. The groups are further broken down into STS, Figure 6 shows the 
organization and breakdown of the 24th SOW to the STS level.  Each STS provides for a 
quick responsive deployable force to provide for mission support to overseas special 
operations. STS provides battlespace commanders with the unique capability to be able to 
recover personal and/or sensitive equipment during multiple domain mission requiring the 
of the integration of airpower.54 
 
Figure 6. 24th SOW Organization Chart.55  
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2. History of Pararescue 
Pararescue, which is affectionately known as “PJ,” began during WW2. In August 
of 1943, a plane carrying 21 allied members made a controlled landing in the Chinese-
Burma jungle.56 The crash location was in a remote jungle and only accessible by paradrop. 
A flight surgeon and two enlisted corpsmen parachuted voluntarily into the crash location. 
Taking nearly a month, the trio rescue force led the crew back to allied-held territory 
completely unharmed. Famed war correspondent Eric Sevareid was among those rescued 
and wrote that “Gallant is a precious word. They deserve it.”  
Following the war, the Army Air Corps was designated as the Air Force. 
Recognizing the potential for aircraft and operations to continue to occur behind front lines, 
the Air Force adopted the need for a highly competent and specialized rescue force. Modern 
pararescue can trace its origins back to 1947.  
During the Korean war, the Air Forces PR mission was successful in the rescue of 
nearly 1,000 personnel from behind enemy lines. However, after the war the force 
atrophied. The cycle of developing strong personal recovery skills and a capable force was 
again repeated during the Vietnam years, but only for the duration of the conflict.57 The 
Air Force had a habit of developing strong air Combat Control and Personnel Recovery 
functions during periods of greatest need. However, after each conflict period, the efforts 
would atrophy and fund to the programs would ultimately get cut.  
The air force also organized rescue forces by tying them to the aircraft platforms. 
During the 1980s aircraft platforms became designated by multimission functions and 
away from specific mission functions. PJ were directly tied and supported by rescue 
aircraft. The late 1980s predicted that the number of PJ billets would be cut by 2/3 simply 
by designation of aircraft mission capabilities. In the late 1980s, the Twenty-Third Air 
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Force historian noted that PJ authorizations were “tied to [the] numbers of aircraft assigned 
to various rescue detachments and squadrons.”58 
3. Assessment, Selection, and Training 
PJ remained solely enlisted. At first, they drew from the medic communities. As 
with the medical community, battlefield medics have traditionally been enlisted. The 
reason for this is that this relieved the availability and length of training for medical doctors 
and field surgeons. Field medical training could be expedient to a large force, given and 
trained to an enlisted force to quickly grow and expand the deployment of trauma medics 
alongside battle troops. This trend continued and stayed this same way as the focus on 
recovery operations remained largely on the medical community and necessity of having 
experienced medics. The original inception plan was to deploy a field surgeon with three 
enlisted medics, all trained in paradrop and rapid deployment. Within the first few years, 
and with the availability of field surgeons, the plan was scrapped, and solely enlisted 
medical personnel were chosen to represent the Pararescue community. It also became 
apparent that the operating environment of a PJ could drastically change, they could be 
recovering personnel from the jungles of Burma, the mountains of Korea, to the deserts of 
Iran. This necessitated creating a pipeline and training to fit and meet those specific 
requirements.  
To fully train a PJ from inception to assignment at an STT can take in excess of 77 
weeks of training (Figure 2). One of the SOF truths is that SOF cannot be mass-produced. 
This truth is represented and displayed in the PJ assessment. Historically attrition rates 
remain significantly high, prior to the implementation of a combined Combat Control 
Technician (CCT) and PJ indoctrination and preparatory course in 2000, the attrition rate 
for PJ was as high as 80%.59 Due to the need for the Air Force to produce quality PJ 
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candidates and the length of time it requires for training, it behooves the AF to invest in 
quality leadership and training at the highest levels to ensure that the PJ community 
maintains and focuses on retention.  
 
Figure 7. Flow chart of CRO/PJ Training Pipelines.60  
 
60 U.S. Air Force, 2019. 
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4. Friction with Officer and Enlisted Community 
Enlisted pararescue was extremely great at their mission capabilities. The mission 
accomplishments are highlighted on the Air Forces community website. The Pararescue 
community is the highest decorated enlisted force within the Air Force. According to the 
webpage, from the Air Forces inception until 2013, the PJ is highly decorated having been 
awarded one medal of honor, 12 Air Force Crosses, and 105 silver stars.61 However, the 
community suffered from a large attrition rate during initial training and a loss of retention 
at upper levels of command.  
While the enlisted force is tactically competent, they lacked a cohesive voice to 
defend their community and advocate on their behalf at the operational and strategic levels.  
5. Creation of the CRO 
The Air Force took several steps to ensure that the PJ community remained healthy 
and a viable option for Combatant Commanders to tap into. First the reorganization of the 
rescue community. Second, the creation of SOCOM pulled Air Force Special Operations 
Command into a cohesive organization with a strategic focus.  
Operation Eagle Claw lead to a disaster at a rendezvous point “Desert One.” This 
was a failed hostage rescue event that occurred in Iran in 1980. 44 American diplomats, 
military and embassy staff were held hostage after protestors stormed the U.S. embassy. A 
combined joint task force attempted a rescue, that ended in mission failure and the deaths 
of 8 service members. Following the disaster, a congressional hearing recommended 
sweeping changes to the American Military. The Air Force proactively made changes to 
reorganize, specifically the AF established the Twenty-Third Air Force in 1983 to become 
the home for all associated USAF special operations.62  
 
61 “U.S. Air Force - Career Detail - Pararescue,” accessed November 24, 2019, 
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As early as 1986, there was discussion of creating a pararescue officer that could 
liaison between the ground elements and development of new rescue units.63  A Memo was 
circulated by the director of Combat Control Operations at Twenty Third AF discussing 
the relationship between Combat Controllers and Pararescue forces. Recognizing that the 
Pararescue community suffered from a lack of planning, budgeting, and allocation of 
resources at senior ranks.64 The director was forthcoming with ideas to professionalize the 
Air Force rescue operations. “The 23 AF is currently developing a concept of operations 
for pararescue that returns mission emphasis to ground operations vice aircrew 
involvement. This could ultimately result in a career field reorganization, establishment of 
a pararescue officer corps”.65 This laid the foundational ideas to create the CRO pipeline. 
However, it would still take 14 years before this idea would reach fruition.  
Finally, in 2000, the Secretary of the Air Force announced interest in the creation 
of the combat rescue officer specialty.66   
6. CRO Pipeline and Training 
One of the defining characteristics of a special operations force is an assessment 
and selection. Unlike conventional forces, which often rely upon the strength of superior 
numbers, such as which infantry army is the largest, or which air force has the most planes, 
SOF specifically relies quality operators. One of the defining SOF truths is described as 
quantity over quality.67 The main criterion that potential CRO are assessed for is 
leadership. They must be competent leaders under the high-stress environment of rescue 
insertion and extraction, in multiple environments across the globe.  
Combat Rescue Officers do undergo a five-day screening. The first step is 
psychological screening. This is an interview process with a three-person panel to 
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determine if the candidate is acceptable. Then the CRO candidate will accomplish a range 
of tasks over a five-day period.68  
After the initial selection process, both pararescue and CRO attend the 
Pararescue/CRO indoctrination course together.69 This is a selection course designed to 
fulfill three purposes. The first is to serve as a physical assessment and preparation for the 
Pararescue/CRO follow on training. The second purpose is to build teamwork within the 
scope of the Air Force core values. Lastly, the course aims to develop leadership and 
career-enhancing skills.  
a. Growth and Expansion 
Eventually, the Air Force designated the Guardian Angel weapons system. This 
allows for PJ, CRO, and Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) specialists to act 
as a sole weapons platform. This does not specifically tie personal to an equipment 
platform, but rather to a specific mission.  
7. Mission of PR 
The mission statement on the Air Forces website states “Air Force Combat Rescue 
Officers (CROs) lead the Department of Defense’s (DoD) only elite ground combat force 
specifically organized, trained, equipped, and postured to conduct full spectrum Personnel 
Recovery (PR) to include both conventional and unconventional combat Rescue 
Operations.”70 While long this does not capture the command and control element that 
CRO provides to the Guardian Angel weapon system. Additionally, at the operational level 
they create guidance and provide instruction to the joint warfighting capability.  
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At the larger strategic level, a CRO will provide input towards policy, plans, and 
programs, while serving on battle staff positions in order to support theater commanders 
with expert input on PR operations.  
The PJ community draws many parallels to the SWCC community. Both 
communities are of a similar size. The SWCC community is inventoried at around 700 
whereas the PJ community is listed at 500 personnel.71 Both draw niche mission sets, where 
PJ are focused on PR, the SWCC community is focused on maritime special operations. 
This provides for a unique take to look at and identify any issues that the PJ community 
has with the CRO.  
B. NORWEGIAN SOF CASE STUDY 
Information on this case study is lacking. Previous thesis projects, conducted at 
NPS provided the majority of this research.72 While publicly available information is lack, 
it is essential to note that the NPS thesis has been influential in reforming and proposing 
Norwegian defense policy. In a 2004 Thesis, Robertson proposed that the MKJ and the 
HJK operated as two separate entities and should be unified under a central command 
authority. The two units had gone through substantial changes since the end of the cold 
war. The first was the fall of Soviet communism. Second, was a focus on combatting 
terrorism after 9/11. Thirdly, by the need to protect Norwegian oceanic interests against 
piracy and criminal threats.73 The drastic changes left Norwegian special operating forces 
(NORSOF) with roles that were mostly out of date.  
Following the publishing of Robertsons thesis, Norway drastically changed its 
organization of SOF. NORSOF established a strategic headquarters in 2014, model after 
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the influence of U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to ensure the proper 
strategic utilization of its special operations capabilities.74   
1. History 
The history of modern-day NORSOF can be traced back to World War 2. British 
commando units began to operate within Norway as early as 1940.75 British Prime minister 
Churchill directed two units, Company Linge and Shetland Group, to be formed under the 
special operations executive in 1940. Company Linge was to train local forces and conduct 
sabotage and subversion in enemy-occupied territories. Whereas Shetland Group began to 
train refugees that fled after the German occupation of Norway. The Shetland Group 
specifically utilized and trained fishermen and mariners to train to fight against the German 
forces. Following World War 2, these special units were disbanded, and their members 
were either separated from the service or joined the ranks of the conventional military.  
Inspired by underwater attacks during World War 2, the Norwegian Intelligence 
Service and Norwegian Navy started a combat diving program, the froskemenn, in 1953.76 
As the unit grew and matured, its mission expanded to included explosive ordnance 
disposal, sabotage, and clandestine insertions.  In 1968 the frokesmenn was officially 
disbanded, and two separate entities were created in its place. A defensive unit 
Minedykkertroppen, and an offensive unit Marinejegerlaget (MJL). The offensive 
capabilities of MJL continued to develop and eventually included maritime 
reconnaissance, raids, sabotage against ships and harbors. The mission of MJL was deemed 
to be of too high a strategic importance, so conscripts were officially denied, and an 
assessment and selection process was developed.77  
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Following the Munich Olympic attacks, Norway was concerned with possible 
terrorist attacks on maritime economic interests in the North Sea.78 Jurisdiction of the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf applied to the Department of Justice. Norway decided to 
utilize the Army and create a maritime capable counter-terrorism force. Thus, the Armys 
HJS was developed and deemed operationally feasible in 1984. An unintended 
consequence was confusion over the missions and functions between the Norwegian Navy 
and the Norwegian Army SOF. This confusion was not evident during the Cold War, and 
only become apparent after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Norwegian military 
downsized. Thus, the Navys MJL restructured in 1991 and became the MJK, more 
reminiscent of the modern NORSOF model.79 Shortly thereafter, the Army changed from 
the HJS to the HJK in 1997 to reflect a more distinct status.80 
In the early 2000s, the MJK was organized into four squadrons.81 The Echo 
squadron was officially deemed as the special boat squadron. Beginning in 2005, an 
additional type of operator was selected and trained, known as the Spesialbåtoperatør, 
roughly translated into English as special boat operator. This would be the Norwegian 
version of SWCC.  
2. Formation of NORSOCOM 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both units had deployed to Afghanistan. Their 
effectiveness as a SOF was highly recognized by U.S. military leaders.82 However, both 
units continued to suffer from competing missions, taskings, and funding. In 2011, Norway 
suffered a series of terrorist attacks that underscored the need for both units to support 
counter-terrorism operations domestically. Officially on 01 January 2014, both units 
merged underneath of a unified command, NORSOCOM.  
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Following the merger, the first Commanding Officer,  Rear Admiral Nils Holte 
spoke in Oslo about the merger and friction that was expected and encountered;  
Obviously, there are cultural differences between FSK and MJK. The two 
units have developed in each of their respective military branches. Cultural 
differences are fairly obvious between the Army and Navy, and this is also 
reflected in MJK and FSK. Do MJK and FSK represent two different 
organizational cultures? My answer to that question is a little yes, but mostly 
no… I’m sure that we who serve in Special Operation Forces together will 
succeed in creating and consolidating an organization characterized by 
solidarity.83 
C. SUMMARY  
The Pararescue community has demonstrated that it is entirely possible to create a 
specialized unrestricted line officer program solely from the enlisted force. They 
successfully established and developed officers to execute their niche program. The 
creation of the Combat Rescue Officer exemplifies how military organizations can change 
at the lowest levels when the enlisted force is empowered by leadership and included in 
strategic planning.  
Norway’s creation of NORSOCOM demonstrated that an organization can change 
as a result of changes within the operating environment. NORSOCOM was created to 
ensure that the different special forces, within Norway’s military, received proper political 
representation, utilization, and were not overlapping in taskings. NSW can learn and apply 
lessons from both the U.S. Air Force and Norwegian SOF. Both represent that change can 
come from internal pushes, and that change does not have to be directed or forced after a 
large shift.  
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Naval Special Warfare has evolved from its ad hoc origins into the exceptionally 
professional organization by a combination of both SEAL and SWCC operators. The 
SWCC training pipeline has significantly contributed to this evolutionary improvement. 
With the addition of the individual enlisted Navy SB rating, talent retention has 
tremendously improved over the last two decades. However, the organizational structure, 
where SEAL officers lead SWCC remains much as it has since the inception of NSW. The 
as-is model identifies that SWCC continues to have a lesser voice at strategic planning 
level. Additionally, SEAL junior officers currently do not have much incentive to lead at 
the special boat troop level.  
The two case studies supported the notion that the issues of coordination and 
representation are not unique to NSW. Both the U.S. Air Force and Norwegian SOF have 
experienced similar inefficiencies as their SOF have grown and evolved over time. Air 
Force special operations forces have shown steady growth in the line officer program when 
appropriately incentivized. Norwegian NORSOCOM has demonstrated that external 
factors can play an important role in shaping the overall structure of a military SOF 
organization.  
B. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Research Questions  
What affect would the development of a SWCC unrestricted line office program 
have on NSW operational and career development?  
a. Conclusion 
The U.S. Air Force and the Norwegian special operations command has recently 
improved their organizational and leadership opportunities of their special operating 
forces. Through the development of manpower models that replicated U.S. special 
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operating forces identified significant improvement in capabilities. Timing will be an initial 
hurdle to overcome in the development and implementation  of an entirely new line officer 
program. NSW has shown that even small changes can be beneficial in the development in  
leadership within the existing SWCC community. 
b. Recommendations 
NSW should focus on enhancing the relationship between SWCC and SEAL. NSW 
should place a greater emphasis on the SWCC chief warrant officers (CWO) to serve a 
greater role at the special boat troop officer in charge level. Additionally, commanding 
officers should place emphasis on encouraging SWCC senior enlisted to apply for the 
CWO program. Efforts should be made to incentivize junior SEAL officers to request 
positions at special boat teams, creating additional value by having SEAL officers rise 
through the ranks and greater buy into the SWCC community once those same officers 
achieve command rank levels.  
2. Secondary Question  
Will the addition of an additional qualification designator incentivize SEAL 
junior officers and create recognized leadership opportunities between SWCC and 
SEAL Naval special warfare communities? 
a. Conclusion 
SEAL junior officers lack clear incentives to request a leadership positions at SBTs. 
This exacerbates animosity amongst the NSW organizations. Despite this animosity an 
SBT troop still has more equipment and associated responsibilities, and the same, if not 
more personnel than a SEAL troop. If a billet remains classified as disassociated and not a 
leadership milestone, there remains little extrinsic incentive for a SEAL junior officer to 
accept the billet at a boat team.  
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b. Recommendations 
PERS-4X should provide more incentives to improve leadership. A possible 
incentive is to assign a boat troop commander an AQD and a SEAL troop commander as 
equivalent tours.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research should be compared against the results of the SWCC manpower 
study. Future research could develop hypothetical models incorporating data from the 
manpower study, to determine a better organizational design for SEAL and SWCC 
interaction at a special boat team. The results could show a preferred career path for SEAL 
junior officers. The results can be utilized to improve the NSW Force optimization model.  
Additional data could be gathered from Naval Personnel Command to compare 
SEAL officer advancement of those that served at an SBT and those that served at a SEAL 
team. Rate of advancement amongst O-2 through O-5 should be utilized to determine the 
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